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ABSTRACT. This paper reviews some of the threats to scientific independence in the
Netherlands that have recently alerted the scientific community. The problems are not only
apparent in research requested by the government or local authorities; they are also found in
a variety of research fields. They are essentially related to the increasing dearth of research
funding in the universities. In Europe in general, and the Netherlands in particular, there
are no large, independent research foundations which exist elsewhere, so research funding
generally depends on funding by government, local authorities or industry. The problem has
long been underappreciated and no effective action has been taken. However, more recently
and as a consequence of media reports, a number of drastic measures are being taken. This
paper deals first with the nature of the threats to the integrity of scientific research, and then
reviews the type of actions that have been, and could be taken.
KEY WORDS: applied research, exact sciences, research for big business, research for
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1. INTRODUCTION
There was a time in the Netherlands when all important research was done
by universities. These used to fund their own research, whether it was
conducted in the social science or natural science faculties. Naturally, such
research was rarely directly relevant to policy makers, either in government
or industry. But societies change and since about the 1980s two particular
developments have slowly put an end to the situation of exclusive academic
research.
First, there was a growing need among governments and in parliament
to have access to research information in order to build on, to support and
possibly to amend policies. Second, there were similar needs for research
in private business, such as the pharmaceutical industry, which expected
to increase its profits in this way. Both developments, however useful they
may be, imply some serious threats to the integrity of researchers and to
the scientific independence of commissioned research. They may lead to
research of dubious quality, to the proliferation of marketing bureaus as
well as to questions about the independence of researchers and even of
universities.
In this paper I first consider the arguments pleading for the existence of
a government research centre, the objective of which is to conduct what
is called ‘policy research’, serving to enlighten the government on policy
issues and to propose possible solutions and actions. Second, I examine
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the arguments against such a centre, the central question in the paper being
the issue of the scientific integrity of researchers and how to guarantee it.
However, there are also other important questions, such as the intrinsic
usefulness of such research and the use politicians make of it. Third, I deal
with threats to the independence of researchers coming from two different
sources, where a distinction should be drawn between research commis-
sioned by political authorities and research requested by industrial concerns
and private business organisations. I conclude by formulating some solu-
tions to what is in some respects a worrying situation, because if research
centres and universities do not take serious action to insure their scientific
integrity they will lose their credibility, not only in the political or industrial
world, but also, and even more importantly, with the general public.
1.1. A Government Research Centre
Institutionalised, policy-relevant research started in the Netherlands in
the 1980s. At the start of the 1980s the Minister of Justice invited
Professor Wouter Buikhuisen, who taught Criminology at the University
of Groningen, to come to the Hague and accept a post as a senior civil
servant, his main task being to develop a research centre that would work
exclusively for the Minister and the Department of Justice. At that time the
universities did not want to conduct research at the Ministry’s request: judi-
cial policies were subjected to severe criticism and conducting research for
the Ministry was considered contaminated work. Moreover, persons who
would conduct what was called applied research were considered by their
colleagues to be second-rate researchers. The term most used in that re-
spect was ‘Government criminology’ as opposed to university criminology,
which was supposed to be fundamental and of higher quality. This attitude
should be understood in relation to the privileged situation enjoyed by the
universities in the 1960s and 1970s and the circumstance that they had their
own research budgets and were not pressured to seek funding from out-
side parties. This means that they could afford to cultivate a condescending
attitude with respect to this type of research as well as with respect to re-
searchers who conducted it. In addition, in those rare cases that universities
accepted government work, they frequently did not respect the details of
the research contract, in particular the requirement to finish the study on or
before the stipulated date.
On the other hand, the authorities had a pressing need for policy rec-
ommendations on complex issues, based on scientific research which the
universities could not or would not deliver. This need was related to the
increasingly important role that public authorities played in social life in
general and with respect to the police, the probation service and the Youth
protection service in particular, a role which was a direct consequence of
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the rise and development of the Welfare state (van Dijk 1982), implying
a multiplication of services to the public rendered by the state. Aware of
the fact that, since the 1960s, there had been a huge increase in crime,
juvenile crime in particular, the Ministry of Justice realized that the usual
policies were inadequate in dealing with the situation: they could not be
continued and there was a need for scientific contributions. A complicating
matter at that time, in common with most of Europe, was that the majority
of Professors of Criminology were lawyers who were not particularly in-
terested in research. In fact Buikhuisen was an exception: he was the first
psychologist to be appointed as Professor of Criminology, which indicates
that up to that time the social sciences with their empirical tradition had not
yet penetrated Dutch Criminology. Moreover, Buikhuisen was particularly
interested in both policy problems and applied scientific research. He had
conducted a series of psychological experiments on to traffic safety, one
such study showing quite clearly the negative consequences of even very
minor alcohol consumption on the driver’s visual alertness. These studies
resulted in considerably more restrictive legislation on driving after having
consumed alcohol. As expected, Buikhuisen was interested in the new po-
sition and accepted the offer from the Minister of Justice, but not without
stating specific requirements upon which his acceptance was conditional.
For example, he wanted the freedom to personally select the researchers
for the new centre because he wished to guarantee their intellectual level as
well as their methodological training. In order to be able to engage quality
researchers he claimed for them the right to publish articles under their
own name, to speak on the radio or appear on television. He also sought a
guarantee that all studies would be published and that the staff of the centre
– and not some civil servants – would decide on the content of the publi-
cations. In other words, what he tried to achieve for the government centre
was maximum openness and transparency, since he considered – rightly
– that this requirement was the conditio sine qua non for the credibility
of such a centre, both in parliament and among the general public. The
Minister of Justice accepted the conditions and I have to say that from its
start in 1973 and during the almost 20 years that I have been working in
the centre, these conditions have to a large degree been respected by the
Ministry’s senior personnel, although they never went unchallenged and
the centre had to stand up for them on a number of occasions.
1.2. How Did This Transparency Work in Practice?
One element was that, after a period of 3 months in which the Minister
of Justice and the department could work out a reaction to a report, the
centre then sent all its reports directly to the permanent Justice Commis-
sion in Parliament. In addition, whenever the outcomes of the study were
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unexpected, related to current problems or had real political importance,
we issued a press release or held a press conference. Researchers also reg-
ularly gave interviews on radio or television. An important reason for the
Minister’s not interfering in the way the centre operated was that, in or-
der to maintain his credibility in Parliament, he could not allow himself
to dissimulate research outcomes, even if he did not like them. Such in-
terventions invariably leak and the consequence would be that he would
no longer be able to make an appeal to the centre’s research outcomes to
justify his policies or to convince Parliament of the need to take specific
measures. This does not mean that there were never conflicts or pressures:
with this type of research there always are. The reason is – and this is
precisely what distinguishes fundamental research from applied research
– that the consequences of policy research may basically have far-reaching
political and financial consequences.
2. WHY A GOVERNMENT RESEARCH CENTRE?
The centre’s founders were profoundly convinced that the social sciences
had an additional mission besides the task of conducting fundamental re-
search and advancing scientific knowledge, which is to serve society and to
make a contribution, however small, to a somewhat fairer, more humane and
more rational society. Although that was probably a rather naı¨ve idea, it has
been a Leitmotif of our efforts. One might say that a number of postulates
underlie this type of judicial and criminological research (Junger-Tas 1979).
The first is the existence of a certain consensus on the main goals of
criminal justice policy, which might be summarised as the protection of
society and the state of law as well as the life and possessions of individual
citizens. The operationalisation of these goals is found in penal law and
more concretely in the criminal justice system. In the Memorandum ac-
companying the annual budget in 1977, the Minister of Justice made these
goals explicit, recognising that in the final analysis these are determined
by the general values and norms that express the way in which we wish to
organise our society. In this logic the essential objective of policy research
will always be to contribute to the realisation of these goals, the essential
assumption being that the system is sufficiently transparent to be able to
study it (van Dijk 1982).
The second postulate is that assisting policy by means of research is
absolutely necessary in our actual society. This postulate has its origin
mainly in the century of Enlightenment. It implies that one can study social
phenomena with the methods of the physical sciences. This in turn implies
an emphasis on science and technology in relation to a rational view of
men as well as emphasising a faith in the possibility of examining social
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life by scientific methods (Berting 1990). Significantly, the use of reason
as materialized in research should lead to a better relation between the
objectives that have to be realised and the means that are used, rather
than the simple use of past experience and common sense. For example,
evaluation research enables us to learn about our mistakes much more
quickly, and to profit much earlier from a new and effective approach than
any other method. In reality, the confidence we have in policy research flows
logically from the efforts we make to solve society’s problems rationally.
We have opted for a society which, while testing a specific solution to a
definite problem, evaluates this solution, then applies a modified approach
and evaluates this once again. This evolutionary process is an expression
of what Coleman (1972) has called a ‘scientific’ society, which is a society
that uses scientific methods to change itself.
The question here, however, is what the real contribution of science to
policy making can be. I think that a primary role of researchers is to assist
civil servants to translate and formulate the problems they are confronted
with in terms that can be studied. Sometimes the problem at hand is related
to a second problem or stems from a much more fundamental one. Some-
times a quick answer is demanded to a complex situation, which would
rather require an in-depth study. Anyway it is necessary to clarify the un-
derlying question and to examine whether this question can be studied. In
this respect one of the most useful roles of a government centre is to eval-
uate new penal measures (Junger-Tas 1993). The ideal format in this field
is to introduce innovations in penal policy under experimental conditions
in order to be able to evaluate them, then to modify these as a consequence
of the evaluation, and only then to change the law. We have succeeded in
following this model several times, among them the introduction of Com-
munity Service in penal policy. As a consequence of the evaluation, the new
sanction was modified and only after this process was the modified sanc-
tion adopted in penal law. In other cases, though, policy makers were too
pressed by the political process and did not want to wait for research results.
3. FUNDAMENTAL AND APPLIED RESEARCH
If one wishes to pinpoint the differences between fundamental or theoretical
research and applied research, one realises that the research methods of the
social sciences have been developed for the disciplines themselves – more
precisely for generating and testing hypotheses serving to support, modify
or innovate theory. Indeed, these methods have not been developed for doing
applied and evaluative research on government measures (Coleman 1972).
Since Coleman wrote that, however, there has been considerable progress
and there is now an extensive body of knowledge referring to evaluation
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research and more recently to specific methods applicable in prevention
research. The most important distinction between theoretical and applied
research, however, is that the former addresses scientific questions, such
as the accumulation or extension of knowledge, and aims at theoretical
conclusions, while the latter addresses political and policy decisions, and
as such is action-orientated. So there is an essential difference in objective
between the two research methods. Since theoretical research is restricted
to the discipline itself, it is there that the study object and its objective are
found, and the results have to serve the discipline’s progress. Outcomes are
disseminated in scientific journals, books and occasionally find their way
into the mass media, while a possible impact on social practice may be a
secondary objective but is certainly not a primary, nor the most important
goal.
Applied research, on the other hand, finds its subject outside the dis-
cipline, in social reality. Its results are addressed to practical policy and
the aim is to improve policy, commonly within the framework of the pre-
vailing values and norms in society. The specific properties of this type of
research refer to both research domains and depend on the capacities of
the researcher to reconcile the two. Besides these fundamental differences,
however, there are other distinctions. For example – and importantly – so-
cial reality is situated in a specific time period. Consequently, the decisions
to which research may contribute are constrained by that same time period,
which means that policy decisions will not only be determined by the study,
but also by unexpected new events that may interfere with its outcomes.
Another problem refers to the interests of researchers. There is an on-going,
fierce competition among university researchers for status and social po-
sition within the discipline, while in social life the main conflicts refer to
conflicts of interest between social groups controlling certain resources.
This circumstance implies that research outcomes are never neutral, but
may contribute to changing the existing power structure in a specific field.
In his book, Coleman (1972) listed a number of basic principles that should
characterize applied research, of which I recall the following:
• Political decisions have to be taken at a specific moment in time and
cannot be based on information that reaches decision makers after that
decisive moment. This is why partial information, available at the mo-
ment when action is required, is more useful than complete information
that arrives too late.
• The value of research outcomes resides rather in the fact that one is
able to present adequate guidelines for action than in methodological
sophistication and theoretical parsimony. This means that applied re-
search has to use the solid methodology of the social sciences, resulting
in outcomes with a high degree of probability, rather than sophisticated
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methods requiring a great number of preceding assumptions that are
seldom realised in social reality.
• Data collection should be based on multiple sources and a variety of
methods should be used to analyse the data. To the extent that partial
outcomes are pointing in the same direction, one may have more confi-
dence in its global conclusions.
• Although theoretical research distinguishes independent and dependent
variables, applied research differentiates among three classes of vari-
ables: 1) policy outcomes; 2) political variables, i.e., those that are con-
trolled by politicians; and 3) situational variables, which are outside the
control of politicians but have to be controlled by the researcher. It is very
important to distinguish variables that may be manipulated by politicians
from variables that cannot be influenced, since the latter may render any
policy action impossible.
• Applied research includes two conversion processes: the conversion of
a practical and policy problem into a research methodology and the con-
version of research outcomes into social and political reality. The values
derived from social practice determine the formulation of the political
problem, but the essential and intrinsic values of the scientific approach,
such as objectivity, transparency, and replicability, must determine the
execution of applied research.
Does all this mean that applied research does not contribute at all to
the development of the social sciences or criminology? I don’t think so,
as witnessed, for example, by the development of victimology, greatly
stimulated by the victimization surveys systematically organized by gov-
ernment centres in the UK, the Netherlands and Finland. Since then many
universities have come to participate in such studies. Another example is
the in-depth studies of sub-systems of the criminal justice system, such as
the operation of the police, the penitentiary system, the probation service
or the way prosecutors and judges take decisions. A third example is the
enormous development of the specific methodology of evaluation research
on experimental interventions in social reality.
4. PROBLEMS IN GOVERNMENT RESEARCH
Applied research on behalf of national or local authorities, however, does
not only have supporters, and universities have formulated a number of crit-
icisms as well as warnings about the dangers that threaten this type of study.
A first observation refers to the applicability of the research. In this
respect there exist a certain number of criteria, such as the question whether
authorities are really interested in solving the studied problem, whether
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those who commissioned the research have sufficient political power to
bring about change, and whether there is funding available for change
(Welters 1978).
Another point of criticism is that the distance between policy decision
makers and researchers is usually too great for the study to really have an
impact on political decisions. This is the reason that in our centre we used
to have regular meetings with the appropriate departments. The frequency
of our contacts with policy makers resulted in more ready acceptance of the
study’s outcomes, even when they were negative, and it made a real impact
on policy decisions possible. The danger of such a procedure, however, is
that it increases a tendency among researchers to perceive the management
and political problems of the Ministry as if they were their own and so
they may end up lacking critical distance, because as the saying goes, ‘To
understand everything is to forgive everything’.
Related to this question is a difference in conception about ‘the truth’.
For a Ministerial or multinational bureaucracy, outcomes that do not disturb
the Minister or the internal or external organization of that bureaucracy
are ‘truthful’. That is one reason why penal interventions that are received
enthusiastically by the general public will always be valorised, even without
any evidence that the programme has achieved any legitimate political
objectives. In addition, to a politician all research outcomes that reinforce
his power position are by definition valid outcomes.
A practical difficulty for the conscientious researcher is the sudden oc-
currence of a burning policy problem to which he has to respond in a very
limited period of time, if not immediately. Such research can only be su-
perficial and has little reliability. On the other hand, if solid and serious
research into the matter reaches policy decision makers at a moment when
the decision has already been taken, it is not very useful. This is one of
the reasons why policy makers are making increasing use of commercial
marketing agencies. My experience with these agencies has taught me that
their studies are usually conducted hastily, that their methodology is rather
weak, that their outcomes are those we would have expected even without
any study at all, and that their recommendations above all please those who
commissioned the research.This does not mean that academic and univer-
sity researchers don’t fall into this trap, though. Too often they accept the
definition of the problem as it has been given by those who fund the study,
without any critical examination of the validity of that definition. Moreover,
in today’s society researchers know exactly where they can find funding
and they are often ready to embrace any question ‘a` la mode’, susceptible
they are to raising money. For example, in the United States we have seen
successive trends in research topics, which were directly influenced by the
agenda of the country’s criminal justice administration. This explains the
different waves of research on incapacitation and career criminals, followed
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by research on drugs and now, of course, on organised crime and terrorism.
There is indeed a danger in allowing (funding) administrative authorities
to decide exclusively on research topics, since this may seriously restrict
the field of research.
A real threat to the scientific integrity of applied research is the fact
that the mandated study often operates as an alibi for policy decision mak-
ers, as when the Minister has to meet some requirements of Parliament.
In these cases the study often serves to delay difficult political decisions
sine die. In some cases the study also serves to justify decisions that have
already been taken. Obviously, such studies will not have any real impact
on policy making. Finally, sometimes the main function of commissioned
research is simply to increase the influence, power or income of those who
commissioned the research, which is particularly – but not exclusively –
characteristic of industrial research.
One hidden objective of those who mandate a study is that the research
outcomes have to maintain and consolidate their bureaucratic system. If
there are successful outcomes, these are rapidly communicated to the Min-
ister, the staff and the media. If, on the other hand, the outcomes show
serious policy shortcomings, or worse the failure of policy measures taken
in the field under study, the report is often sent back to the researchers with
the suggestion that the methodology followed might not have been correct
and – in particular – requesting revisions.
Another problem that arises if researchers don’t know the bureaucratic
system very well, concerns the recommendations – a crucial aspect of
the whole study. Although they are perfectly capable of pointing out the
problems with which policy makers are confronted, they have considerably
more difficulty in formulating various options to meet these problems,
let alone solve them. On the other hand, policy makers may not always
appreciate the researchers’ recommendations, judging this to be their own
prerogative. As a solution to this dilemma, recommendations often tend
be somewhat meaningless so as to spare sensibilities. In that case they
have two characteristic elements: 1) the well-known formula that ‘more
research is needed to really analyse the problem’, and 2) the recommended
policy measures concern other Ministries or departments than the one that
commissioned the research. Finally in fact, many decisions taken at the
political level, as well as at the level of other bureaucracies, have some
irrational aspects, which of course do not particularly create a climate that
is beneficial to rational recommendations.
5. TWO EXAMPLES OF THREATS TO SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
It should be realised that many criticisms addressed to government re-
search are also valid with respect to research done for the business world,
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although in the latter case the danger for those who commissioned the
study does not reside in possible political risks but in the risks of the mar-
ket, essentially income losses if the study’s outcomes are negative. To the
extent that universities don’t dispose of the necessary finances to develop
their own research programme inspired by academic, theoretical, or even
social interests, the only solution is private funding. This why the exis-
tence of research foundations, unrelated to government or industry, is so
important, since these allow the development of fundamental research and
consequently real progress in the social sciences. In Europe, though, there
is a lack of such independent research foundations, and as far as applied
research is concerned, researchers are often forced to address either the
state or business enterprises in order to get funding.
In 1999 two well known Dutch anthropologists published a widely ac-
claimed as well as severely criticised book, showing for the first time the
reality of the threats to scientific independence, in this case by political
authorities (Ko¨bben and Tromp 1999). Some researchers, university staff
in particular, reacted by vehemently denying the existence of such prac-
tices. Some even criticised the study, accusing the authors of not giving any
indication of the frequency of these threats. However, the authors observed
that this was impossible to measure. If they had conducted a survey among
researchers there would have been doubts about the validity of the answers,
since most researchers who were unduly pressured by policy makers would
not be willing to admit it, so the extent of the threats remains unknown.
Indeed, it has to be said that, at that moment in time, the book gave rise to
a massive reaction of denial on the side of researchers as well as outright
criticism by university heads, who feared their funding source might dry
up! At this point in time, however, nobody would any longer express doubts
about the reality of the power play between funding agents and researchers.
My first example refers to the threats to scientific integrity by public
authorities. It deals with a scientific commission which was to advise the
relevant Minister (on Traffic and Water Management) on the possible exten-
sion of Schiphol airport, an international airport that is constantly striving
to expand its action radius. In this respect it is important to observe that
the airport is not completely privatised since the state still possesses the
majority of the equity. The problem was that the board of directors of
Schiphol, which at the time had four runways for aircraft departures and
landings, wanted to construct a fifth one to be able to handle a greater
number of aircraft. A complication is that Schiphol is situated in a very
densely populated area of the country, so both incoming and departing air-
craft cause considerable inconvenience to residents because of the noise
they produce. In order to meet citizen’s complaints, the government had
established certain acoustic standards specifying the threshold of sound in-
tensity which Schiphol was not permitted to exceed. These were measured
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by a number of special acoustic indicators dispersed in the Schiphol area.
However, dissatisfied with the acoustic threshold standards, both Schiphol
and the government proposed new legislation, changing the places where
the aircraft noise was measured. This was supposed to decrease the level of
noise that was measured and, as a consequence, would allow the construc-
tion of a fifth runway. The Minister in charge of this portfolio supported
the project for obvious political and, particularly, economic reasons, but
when Parliament was confronted with the Schiphol plan there was fierce
opposition. Parliament feared increasing problems with the residents of
the Schiphol area, since the system of acoustic standards had been estab-
lished to protect residents and their assent was an absolute precondition
for enlarging the airport. In 2000, under great pressure from Parliament,
the Minister created an expert commission chaired by a nationally and in-
ternationally widely respected expert on acoustics and geophysics, with
the mandate to examine the question whether the new proposed system of
acoustic standards would offer residents better protection than the old one
in terms of the level of aircraft noise. When the commission was installed,
the Minister emphasised the importance of a procedure that guaranteed its
maximum independence and transparency.
Unfortunately, the first outcomes of the survey did not confirm the
Minister’s political promises to Parliament and the resident population,
since they demonstrated that the old system gave residents considerably
better protection than the intended new system. The Minister was clearly
dissatisfied and, despite these negative outcomes, succeeded in convincing
Parliament to vote for the new law, changing the existing system, by reas-
suring Members of Parliament that the commission would be charged with
its evaluation – in all independence, of course. If the commission should
find shortcomings in the new law these would be remedied immediately.
In 2002, however, the Minister’s successor in a new cabinet, confronted
with the promises made to Parliament, decided to restrict the commis-
sion’s mandate in the Schiphol area to a few locations only. In addition, the
commission no longer had the right to collect independently the informa-
tion needed for the survey: all information would now be supplied by the
Ministry.
In reality, since the dissemination of the first report in 2001, political
pressures on the commission by the authorities were intensified and may
be summarised in terms of three main elements: 1) increasing pressure on
individual members of the commission; 2) citing the commission’s report
incorrectly, correcting this only after the new law had been adopted by
parliament; and 3) insinuating that both the members of the commission
as well as its chair were prejudiced and ill-willed. The Ministry contin-
ually tried to change the content of the report and when this failed, the
report’s conclusions were distorted. The commission, however, persisted
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in concluding that the new law did not meet the promises made to Parlia-
ment and to the Schiphol area residents, but when the commission finally
realised that the political powers had no intention whatsoever of giving any
consideration to these promises, the only way out was to return the mandate
to the Minister. Of course, since then Schiphol has constructed its fifth run-
way, but the inevitable conclusion is that both Parliament and the general
public have been deceived. The important question now is whether there
are lessons to be drawn from this blatant failure to have an impact on pol-
icy by a scientific endeavour to evaluate policy measures and recommend
specific policy options.
A first conclusion is no doubt that where crucial political and economic
interests are at stake, the conclusions and recommendations of any study
have been decided in advance. A so-called ‘independent and scientific’
commission is in fact supposed to deliver a report justifying and legitimis-
ing the course of action that has already been planned. Unfortunately, the
truth is that some experts are often resigned to doing so, the pressures on
them being too great. In these cases an expert commission operates as a
scientific fac¸ade for political decisions that have already been taken at the
government level, but which are controversial at the level of Parliament
and the general public. This is a serious matter, since the process of well
informed, responsible political decision taking by Parliament, as the repre-
sentative of the people, requires correct information on the important issues
at stake. It does not mean at all that the researcher has to put himself in the
policy maker’s place, just as the policy maker should not interfere with the
research process. Each has his own responsibilities: that of the researcher
is to present the politicians with correct, objective information, based on
appropriate scientific analyses, as well as recommendations aimed at the
realisation of the objectives as they are specified in the research mandate.
Policy decision makers may of course decide differently on the basis of
normative considerations, such as other important interests, consideration
of eventual political acceptance of recommended measures, economic fea-
sibility and financial constraints. In that field research no longer has a role
to play and researchers should be resigned to accepting political decisions.
What is unforgivable, however, is to change the order of procedures: that
is, to first take the political decision and to make clear to researchers that
they have to find the necessary arguments that will legitimise it.
However, it is not only government research that we should worry about.
There have lately been a number of worrying signs about the collaboration
between industry and research. Most of the following examples have been
widely publicised in the press, raising great concern about researchers’
independence.
For example, the university hospital of the city of Utrecht discov-
ered in October 2003 that one of its liver disease specialists, conducting
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experimental tests of new equipment to cure a specific liver disease, had
continued to conduct his experiment, even after a number of his patients
were showing very serious, harmful side effects. Moreover, he had not
respected existing procedures for continuous control of the conditions of
experimental tests, which might have resulted in the study’s suspension.
An inquiry revealed that the specialist had a financial interest in the com-
pany that had delivered the equipment. The experimental treatment was
halted and the specialist had to leave the university. Another example is
that of researchers attached to the university hospital of Amsterdam, who
denounced the pharmaceutical industry (in this case Organon) for having
manipulated the outcomes of a study on the third generation of contracep-
tive pills, study that Organon had commissioned and funded. The research
concluded that the second generation pills had fewer side effects than the
new ones and that consequently there was no reason to change contracep-
tives, an outcome that apparently did not please the company, which had just
launched the new pills. A third example concerns nominations of university
professors, which may be financed by a company or by a whole industrial
sector. One professor at the University of Delft no longer wished to take
responsibility for the outcomes of one of his earlier studies, which had
criticised the industry for its destructive effects on the environment. Asked
about his position by the press, his argument was that he could no longer be
too offensive towards the industry since they paid for his chair. Following
the concern this raised in university circles, he had to step down and lost his
chair. The last example refers to the relationship between research on bio-
genetics and interested industrial companies. Taking into account the need
for enormous financial investments in equipment and long-term research
activities required by this type of studies, contracts between the industry
and research laboratories are frequent. The consequence is that the research
is controlled by the industry, which considers the research material as its
property so that free access to research information and databases is not
automatically given to other researchers. Another consequence is that re-
search priorities in this field are increasingly determined by the interests of
the industry rather than those of the university or the general public. More
serious still is that in some cases universities, in their quest for funding,
pressure their researchers not to frighten off possible funding sources by
stating too many research conditions, thus threatening academic liberty and
independence. The danger of this development is that the aim of research
will shift. From exclusively the progress of science, the general good and
the achievement of a high academic reputation as it still is today, it may in-
creasingly come to include personal gain. Of course, it should be observed
that contacts between the university and industry are not intrinsically a bad
thing and may be very useful, but only to the extent that the interests of
both parties do not become intertwined.
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6. DISCUSSION
Considering applied research in its real perspective, a first observation
would be that we have to realize that even the best research is only one ele-
ment in policy decision making, other just as important elements being the
political will to change the law or to change existing practices, and of course
the availability of financial resources. A second observation would be that
with respect to research integrity one might make a distinction between re-
search in the so-called ‘life sciences’, such as pharmacy or medicine where
direct financial interests may endanger the researcher’s integrity and thus
the validity and reliability of the study outcomes, and research conducted
in the social sciences, including criminology and law, where crime policy
interests, including ideological orientations and politics may threaten the
objectivity of the study.
Unfortunately, as far as I know there has not been any systematic re-
search on the issue of threats to the scientific integrity of researchers. As
a consequence we don’t really know the extent to which these practices
exist. Indeed, I have merely presented some particular examples of these
threats that have raised considerable concern in the Netherlands: whether
they are only the tip of the iceberg remains unknown.
However, despite the lack of convincing empirical evidence the recent
multiplicity of examples, indicating the existence of at least some seri-
ous threats to scientific integrity, has alerted the universities and they have
made a number of proposals to change their own current practice. It should
be recognised that since the 1990s all Dutch universities have an Ethics
Commission which has formulated a Code of Conduct with the objective
of avoiding conflicts of interest. For example, there is a code of conduct
for medical research, for research on ethics in medical practice, and for
the social sciences with respect to data protection issues. In addition, since
May 2003 there is a national Commission for academic integrity, which
has an appeal function in cases where conflicts at the university level can-
not be resolved. However, its verdict is not final and it is communicated
to universities as a recommendation only (Ko¨bben 2003). In this respect
the Rector of the University of Amsterdam has observed that all existing
codes specify the correct procedures to follow, whereas there is rather a
need for a code specifying the normative principles which should guar-
antee the credibility and faith in the incorruptibility of academic research
(van der Heijden 2003). In his address on the occasion of the 372nd dies
natalis of his university he recommended a number of specific rules for
academic researchers who accept to work for the market. In this case they
would have to mention in every academic publication their additional func-
tions, such as being a consultant or shareholder in a company as well
as any additional sources of income they have. A different initiative was
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proposed by the Rector of the University of Delft, as a follow-up to the
case of a professor who withdrew his research outcomes in order not to
offend the company that financed his chair. He is going to introduce an
arbitration committee that will decide in cases where research outcomes
are contested and research integrity is attacked. The Professor of Applied
Philosophy at the University of Wageningen, Korthals (2003) wrote in a
press article that the life sciences (genetics and others) should establish
completely transparent contracts with funding agencies that are acceptable
to the public. If they fail to do so citizens-consumers will end up losing
confidence not only in political authorities but also in what may be the
outcomes of scientific research. The author feels that the universities are
taking great risks in allowing systematic encroachment on academic inde-
pendence, or nominations of professors financed by a multinational. More-
over, he pleads that academic journals should require from contributors that
they reveal who funded the research and where the study was conducted.1
The author also argues that in cases where researchers have some finan-
cial interests in the study’s outcomes, for example because they possess
shares in the company funding the research, their articles should be re-
fused by academic journals. Other academics claim that legislative revision
is needed to reinforce the position of the researcher and protect his scientific
integrity.
In conclusion the following more general points may be made.
First, it is absolutely crucial to take into account the long-term interests
of academic research and consequently of scientific progress. In that respect
it is essential to guarantee the independence of researchers in the case of
pressure, be it political or financial. Second, in the case of research that is
funded by third parties, transparent contracts should be signed, specifying,
inter alia, research conditions and responsibilities, data ownership and
uncensored publication of research outcomes in a reasonable period of
time. Third, universities have to make it quite clear that they do not only
work for the government or the market but also for the entire community,
that is for the general good. Finally, universities should pay considerably
more attention to questions of scientific ethics in their curriculum, so that
students and future researchers are taught the norms and values they will
have to respect when they enter the world of research. In this way they
will be better prepared for what they may expect and may be able to resist
pressure, whether they work for national or local authorities or for private
industry.
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